If reports that Bhutan did not ask India to occupy Doklam, and that China notified both Bhutan and India that they were improving the road well in advance (and was provided no objection) are true, this action by India would just compel Bhutan to establish relations with China sooner. But Bhutan may be waiting to see how Sino-Nepal relations progress before committing ties with China, lest it be subjected to the withdrawal of subsidies or a closing of the Bhutan-Indian border as you suggest (also this has happened before) and become economically isolated. I think the problem with Bhutan however that unlike Nepal, 42% of exports consist of energy sales to India, while Nepal's economy is far more diversified and would be able to pivot between the two countries easily. If anything, China would also need to link up its power network with Bhutan's, but I suppose we'll have to see how this plays out.
中国已经开始建立起从兰州到加德满都的铁路线,把从兰州到日喀则的铁路进行延伸。他们也可以很容易地将铁路延伸到距离日喀则仅有100多公里的不丹,所以基础设施已经到位了。鉴于中国对其他国家相当精明的“胡萝卜和大棒”的方针,我猜想中国在尝试解决边界争端和建立官方政治关系的同时,已经提供了不丹铁路连线的计划。
如果不丹没有要求印度占领洞朗高原,而且中国提前知会不丹和印度,他们要改善道路(没有提出异议)的报道是真实的,印度的这一行动只会迫使不丹提早建立与中国的关系。但不丹在此之前可能会先观望中国-尼泊尔关系将会怎么发展,以免像你所说的被印度撤销补贴或关闭不丹-印度边界(曾经发生过),导致经济上的孤立。不过,我认为不丹的问题与尼泊尔不同,不但42%的出口包括能源销售都是对印度,尼泊尔的经济要多样化不少,因此能够轻松地在两个大国之间周旋。至于还有什么可以做的,中国可以其电力网络与不丹联系起来,但我想我们要看这将如何发展。
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