春丕河谷本身是没什么战略价值的,除非最终与洞朗高原相连。它是通过不丹进入喜马拉雅山南部之前沿春丕河谷的最后一块高地,是一个平坦的高原,非常适合驻扎固定火炮和士兵。印度在那里的军队可以阻止任何中国向南通过河谷的入侵。而中国在那里的军队在冲突期间可以从高地打击通往锡金的补给线,同时掩护部队从高原东部向南移动。中国对洞朗高原的控制突然将春丕河谷变成了战略资产。如果可以,我强烈推荐你在Google地球上用3D视图看该地区地理。
至于为什么春丕河谷很重要,中国和印度有两大块争议领土。阿克沙钦被中国控制,因为这在喜马拉雅山的他们一边。但是,阿鲁纳恰尔邦在喜马拉雅山的印度一边,除非将印度的东北部与其他地区切断,否则很难阻止印度持续的补给,这就是为什么尽管1962年中国军队拿下阿鲁纳恰尔邦却还是最终撤退了。在任何未来的关于阿鲁纳恰尔邦战争中,中国围绕锡金的地理位置改善会使得切断印度东北部并将它从印度分离出来容易的多。
所以争议领土的重要性在于它是高地。至于为什么这个问题现在出现,而不是更早或更晚,这可能要复杂得多。
[–]insipid-fauna 35分 11天前
As for why the issue popped up now, instead of earlier or later, that's probably much more complicated.
ome speculation if I may:
Bhutan and China are close to establishing diplomatic ties, which would resolve a lengthy border dispute between the two countries. Under the deal Sinchulumpa and Gieu would have been ceded to Bhutan while the Doklam Plateau would have been ceded to China.
ince negotiations have been dragging on for years, the road building in the plateau would put pressure on the Bhutanese government to settle the issue more quickly lest China secures de facto control over the area without ceding the other two territories. However India, given its suzerainty over Bhutan intervened for the strategic reasons /u/sparky_sparky_boom suggests.
As for the timing, OBOR is ramping up, and the 19th National People's Congress is this September. China has been seeking greater relations with its neighbors (Nepal, Philippines, Myanmar, etc.) in the past year, and Bhutan is likely just one element of this plan. Bhutanese elections are also coming up next year, but it remains to be seen whether this drags on until then.
以下是我的推测:
不丹和中国即将建立外交关系,这将解决两国之间长期的边界争端。根据协定,沈久弄布和基伍将被移交不丹,而洞朗高原将被转交给中国。
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